In this special Fact or or Fiction episode of California Employment News, Weintraub Tobin shareholder Ryan Abernethy and associate Christopher Horsley explain how wage and hour rules, expense reimbursement requirements, and employee location affect remote work arrangements.
Listen for an informative breakdown of what California employers need to know to manage remote teams and reduce compliance risks.
Brutal Honesty Over Hype Since 2008
Your dollar isn’t backed by gold, silver, or anything you can hold. It hasn’t been since 1971. So if a piece of paper is worth something just because the government says so, what stops the richest man on Earth, or the President himself, from saying the same thing about his own money?
The answer tells you more about how money actually works than most economics classes do.
Forget the gold vault. The dollar stands on three pillars:
1. You owe taxes in it. This is the engine nobody talks about. Every American owes the IRS dollars, so every American needs dollars. That creates permanent demand no private company can manufacture.
2. The law enforces it. Dollars settle debts, and courts enforce contracts written in them. Try suing someone for payment in seashells.
3. People trust it. Confidence that the Fed will keep inflation in check, and that the U.S. economy will keep producing things worth buying. Lose that, and you get Zimbabwe, where a 100-trillion-dollar note couldn’t buy a bus ticket.
Bottom line: A currency is backed by a government’s power to tax and the public’s willingness to believe.
He can print all the MuskBucks he wants. He just can’t make them money.
We don’t have to theorize. Two of the most famous names in America already have “their” coins. Here’s how they stack up (prices as of October 13, 2026).
| Dogecoin (DOGE) | Official Trump (TRUMP) | |
|---|---|---|
| Launched | 2013, as a joke | January 2025 |
| Famous backer | Elon Musk (promoter, not creator) | Donald Trump (affiliated issuer) |
| Price | ~$0.084 | ~$1.55 |
| All-time high | ~$0.74 (May 2021) | ~$73 (Jan 2025) |
| Drawdown from peak | ~89% | ~98% |
| Market cap | ~$14.2 billion | Roughly $350–400 million |
| Supply | Unlimited, inflationary | Fixed at 1 billion |
| Wall Street access | Spot ETFs approved | None |
| Can you pay taxes with it? | No | No |
Dogecoin is the survivor. It fell more than 80% in the 2022–2025 bear market, yet held its place among the top 10 cryptocurrencies while thousands of “utility” projects went to zero. The SEC’s approval of spot Dogecoin ETFs was the biggest fundamental change of 2026, giving ordinary brokerage investors a way in. Musk never created it. He just made it famous, and the April 2026 launch of X Money set off speculation that DOGE could become a native payment option. Notice that’s still speculation, not reality.
Trump Coin is the cautionary tale. It’s a Solana-based memecoin created by Fight Fight Fight LLC, a Delaware company, and roughly 80% of supply was retained by Trump-affiliated entities at launch. By February 2026, it had fallen more than 95% from its peak about a year earlier. Meanwhile, Trump’s 2025 financial disclosure reported more than $635 million in royalties tied to the token’s issuing entity. Supporters see a fan collectible and a pro-crypto statement. Critics see a conflict of interest and insiders profiting while retail buyers lost. Either way, the price chart speaks for itself, and analysts note its price is driven mainly by social sentiment and political news, not by any technological use or earnings.
The lesson: Even the two most powerful brand names in America couldn’t turn a token into money. One became a volatile but durable speculative asset. The other became a souvenir that cost most buyers the bulk of their stake. Neither one buys your groceries without first being converted back into dollars.
The realistic path isn’t a meme coin. It’s a stablecoin, a digital token pegged at exactly $1 and backed by cash and Treasuries. The GENIUS Act of 2025 created a legal framework for these, and an X payments stablecoin is a very real possibility.
But notice the irony: a stablecoin is backed by dollars. It isn’t competing with the dollar. It is the dollar, wearing a different jacket.
Every private currency ends up in one of two places: tied to the dollar, or floating on hype. Doge and Trump Coin prove the second path is a casino, not a currency. Neither one dethrones the greenback as long as Uncle Sam collects taxes in it.
So when the next billionaire or politician announces he’s “reinventing money,” ask one question: What can I pay my taxes with? That answer tells you everything.
This post is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice. Crypto prices are highly volatile and change daily.
#ElonMusk #TrumpCoin #Dogecoin #MemeCoin #Dollar #FiatMoney #Stablecoin #Crypto #GENIUSAct #DOGEETF #TheHedge
Elon Musk’s recent political spending is large enough to stand out: roughly $290 million in the 2024 cycle, mostly supporting Donald Trump and Republicans, followed by about $366 million already in the 2025–26 cycle (including roughly $276 million since July 2026 alone). The bulk has gone to the Senate Leadership Fund, his America PAC, and other Republican-aligned groups, making him the largest known individual donor so far in the midterms. Almost all of that capacity comes from the paper value of his stakes in Tesla and SpaceX. The scale of independent spending itself is possible because of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which held that the government cannot ban corporations, unions, and other associations from making independent expenditures advocating for or against candidates. Later rulings cleared the way for super PACs that can accept unlimited contributions so long as the spending remains independent of campaigns. That legal change is one of the clearest roots of a particular form of political inequality: the ability of a small number of people who hold highly valued assets to convert paper wealth into outsized influence over elections and, by extension, policy.
Those valuations sit inside a larger set of numbers that already show concentration. U.S. household real-estate equity is about $35–36 trillion. The S&P 500 and the broader Russell 3000 / U.S. equity market are in the $63–78 trillion range—roughly double the real-estate equity figure. Gross federal debt is near $40 trillion. Real-estate equity is more widely distributed than corporate equity; stock ownership is far more concentrated at the top. Equity-market capitalization is the present value of expected future corporate profits. When a handful of companies (or a handful of individuals’ stakes in them) account for a large share of that value, the people who own the stakes can extract liquidity or borrowing power that ordinary wage earners and most homeowners cannot match. Citizens United then lets that liquidity be spent, without contribution limits, on independent political activity.
What these claims share is dependence on continued willingness to hold them. When buyers are scarce relative to sellers, prices fall until a new balance appears. High multiples amplify the effect because more of the current price rests on expectations rather than trailing cash flow. Tesla’s roughly $1.5 trillion market cap and SpaceX’s roughly $2.2–2.3 trillion valuation embed large expected growth from autonomy, robotics, Starlink, launch, and related options. Musk has periodically described even higher possibilities. These are statements of a path he sees as non-zero probability, not formal forecasts. They help sustain the expectations that keep the equity values elevated and, with them, the political spending capacity.
When those values hold, the stakes are liquid enough, or borrowable against, to fund hundreds of millions in political contributions under the independent-expenditure rules established after Citizens United. When confidence weakens, the spendable wealth shrinks. The same mechanism applies to the broader market. A sustained shift in which sellers dominate produces lower prices, tighter credit, and reduced collateral values. The productive assets themselves do not disappear; the valuations placed on the claims to their output do. The political consequence is that influence tracks asset prices. People whose wealth is concentrated in high-multiple equities can scale their political spending up or down with market sentiment in ways that people whose wealth is mostly in a house, a salary, or a small business cannot.
George Soros has used market-derived wealth for the opposite partisan direction for decades. Through the Open Society Foundations and related entities he has directed tens of billions into progressive and Democratic-aligned causes, open-society projects, and super PACs. In recent cycles the Soros network has remained among the larger Democratic-side funders. The legal structure is identical: personal wealth converted into independent expenditures under the rules Citizens United and subsequent decisions made possible. Critics of each side tend to treat the other’s spending as illegitimate influence while viewing their own side’s as ordinary participation. The mechanical reality is parallel. The inequality is not primarily which party receives the money; it is that a small number of asset holders can deploy sums that dwarf the resources of ordinary citizens or even most organized groups.
The scale difference in any given cycle can be large. Musk’s recent pace has exceeded most other individual donors on the Republican side. Soros’s cumulative activity over many years has been larger in total dollars directed at progressive causes. Both remain contingent on the market valuations that produced the wealth. Musk’s ownership of X adds a distribution channel that further multiplies reach; that platform’s value also depends on continued user and advertiser willingness. None of this requires treating either man’s valuations or spending as uniquely sinister. Concentrated equity wealth, enabled by high multiples on expected future cash flows and by unlimited independent expenditures, simply converts into political capacity more readily than diffuse real-estate equity or wage income.
The national-debt stock adds a separate constraint: interest costs already run near a trillion dollars a year, and continued rollover depends on buyers of Treasuries remaining willing at prevailing rates. Higher yields raise the discount rate applied to equities as well, which can compress the very valuations that fund large political spending. The system continues as long as enough participants are willing to hold the claims—corporate equity, real estate, or government debt—at current prices. When that willingness contracts at the margin, the paper values reprice and the political spending capacity that rides on them contracts with it.
In this sense the combination of elevated asset valuations and the post-Citizens United rules functions as a root of a specific inequality: the unequal ability to translate market-assigned wealth into political voice and policy influence. It does not explain every source of economic disparity—technology, trade, education, family structure, and many other factors also matter—but it is a direct mechanism by which differences in asset ownership become differences in political power. Musk’s ability to write large Republican checks, like Soros’s ability to fund progressive causes, is downstream of those valuations and of the legal rules that allow unlimited independent spending. The valuations themselves are downstream of expectations about future cash flows and the discount rates investors apply. Those expectations can change, and when they do, the political weight of the people who hold the claims changes with them.